Although many of the experiments reviewed by Caporael et d.
are interesting, and we are sympathetic to some ofthe intuith that motivate the target article (e.g., that "selfishness" and "se& interest" as phrases can sometimes be misleading as cham terizations of human psychological mechanisms), the authon' . misco~istrual of much of modem evolutionary theory maka thcir interpretation of their own work problematic. In parti* lar, tl~cir categorization of modem evolutionary theory as NI "egoistic incentive" (El) theory misconstrues claims about the evolutionary process itself as claims about the psychological mechanisms that are the shaped product of the evolutionaq process. Because Caporael et al. are not alone in this confusion, but rather hold misconceptions that persist both within and outside of the evolutionary community, it is worth dwelling on exactly where arguments about whether humans are "basically selfish" or (the authors' alternative) "basically social" go wr onwmny,
In approaching a given species' behavior from an adaptationid perspective, evolutionary analysis requires three nested but distinct levels. These are:
(1) Models of the evolutionary process (involving definitions of fitness, selection, adaptation, genes, and the role of stochastic factors, and general models of such topics as kindirected altruism, reciprocation. sexual recombination,, and s e x d select ion);
(2) An analysis of how these principles were manifested I smies-snecific array of selection vressures. refncted thmul thc spccihc ecologid, social, gendtic, phylogenetic, and in& mational circumstances experienced along a given spedd evolutionarv lineaee:
(3) a de&riptioi of the species' innate adaptive specidh, tions that evolved to solve the uroblems wsed bv the s m d e specific m y of ancestral seledtion preS;ures.
-Ibe advances over the last three decades in the sophistication nd power of evolutionary theory have justifiallly generated an normous amount of excitement, and although m11cl1 still rc- and would never encounter another conspecific. Tlre evolvcd mechanisms regulating altruism towards the mate would act as if they "valued the welfare of the mate as highly as thc individual they were in, because the death or disability of the mate would be reproductive death for the wasp (see discussion in Alcxandcr 1987 on marriage). Moreover. such mechanisms wollld not evolve to dole out assistance difkrentiatcly depending on tlte recipient. but would be indiscriminatcly altruistic, Inwusc the only conspecific ever encountered by an adult was its mute. and so indiscriminate aid was never an error. Finally, imagine researchers who brought such wasps into the lal) to investigate whether wasps wcre "selfish" inclusive fitness maximizers or whether the "selfish gene" theory was bankrupt. In raising such wvps with others, and running experiments on them in virious social situations. they would discover that the wasps were, in mtradiction to "tlkory." perfectly altruistic towards nonrelatives (thus ruling out inclusive fitness explanations of altruism) and toward "strangers" (ruling out reciprocation or mate cooperation as an explanation of altruism). Tlrus. a little hardheaded empiricism would dispel all these "selfish gene" h~co-ries. Similarly. Caporael et ai. experiment on humans by putting them in situations where, for example, the "suldccts were strangers," "their choices were anonymous," "they made a tingId decision." and "interaction among group mehlmrs was prevented before and atter each session" -i.e.. in evolutionarily "nprecedented situations, completely unlike anything humans would have regularly encountered during their Plcistoccne evolution, and therefore situatmns to which their psycltological mechanisms are not adapted.
Clearly, without a theory ofthe selection pressures operating in ancestral environments, evolutionary theory has littlc to ray about psychology, and equally, psychology without this ncccssuy intermediate cannot serve as a test for "selfish gene" approaches (as Caporael et at. appear to believe). This intcrvcning level is necessary to make models of psychological mcchanisms relate to evolutionary theory and vice versa. Wlrcn these three levels are not kept clearly in mind, and mdcls are not evaluated in terms of the appropriate levcl ofanalysis, conlirsion abounds. What Caporael et al. call "selfish gene" theories are the best existing characterizations of how the process of natural selection operates: to refute these theories, the authors would have to propose some new theory of the process of natural selection, or some overlooked element in present modcls of fitness, and this is exactly what the authors do not do. Instead, they misinterpret such theories as theories about motivationsumctl~ing Iiko: Untler all circl~mstanms, cvolr~tionarily anprecvcle~~tccl or not, r 11111nan atgnitivcly rcllrcscnts i~~clt~sivu fitness, u~~cl "scllisl~ly" I~as us a g(u11 tlw! clcsirc to I I I U X~I I I~.~! it. In all foirncss, one ~n t~s t acl~nit that rolne cvolr~tio~~rry rcscercl~crs trcut cvolt~lionury tl~cv~ry this wuy as well (i.e., they treat hrl~nans as litncss strivers), ultlro~~gl~ Inoru ol1c11 this is sin~ply a metapl~)ricul utnmptl~sl sI~ortI~a~~d, used to uvoid C I I I I I~~T S O I I I~ constrnctions (us I)uwkins IlU76; IUH2) tukcs grcut puins to l~riko clear). 111c rc(ll~ire~~~ent to find "I~r~Iivi(l~~~Iistic ~~uyolF." tl~ut is.
-.
c1111a~n.d gcnitk. prolwgution, as t11c clcsigt~ccl cu~~~scc,~rc~~cx! for any psycl~ologicul udi~ptcrtion is not a level 3 stalclncnt aln)lrt psycl~ologicul goals. Hutl~er, it is the cxl~rcssion of Il~e mntral rcc~r~ircn~cnt of tl~c tl~corv of natural sclcction (level 1): uc1i111to-. . tions exist. uncl Iravc the Form tl~cy do, IWUI~ISC tl~cy cnl~a~~ced gcnctic pro11itgitti011 (fit~ress) in unccstrul cutnclitiot~s. No n~ettcr wlrat psycl~ologicul tnccl~aoism is proptsccl, it is incr~~nltct~t on the rescarcl~er to show I~ow gcncs ccdit~g For it cuulcl have spread through the population. IIiswvcring IIOW they ncxumplislred this is not a luxury (Ict alone a metutl~corctical prcj~~dice deriving from Western c~~ltural lmlicfs), ltut is rather an incscapaltlu logical ncrcvssity clcriving from the structt~rc! of evolution by natr~rul selrrction. Cuporacl et ul.'s "suciulity I~ypotbcsis" is a vaguely expressed tl~cory of level 2 (spccics-specific selection prcssurcs), intn~dr~ccd to ocw~ent ktr the in-grot~p Ilias plrcnomcna they ancl otlrcrs havu ena~nntered (a psycl~ological phenomenon, level 3). Tl~cy incnrrectly see tl~eir lcvcl 2 lrypotlresis as exempting tl~cm so~nchow from sl~owing IIOW ingroup Ilias (a lcvcl 3 pl~enomenon) Icacls to "inclividnalistic payoffs," tlrut is, enhnncccl fitness (the lcvcl 1 rccl~~ircmc~~t) in ancestral environme~tts (tile level 2 context). Tltc logicully reclr~irccl attc~npt Ily otl~crs to find lcvcl I uncl level2 cxplat~ations for gmop living (i.e., its fitness pnyolls) is iu~tcr~~rctccl Ity tlre al~thors to n~cun that other rcscarcl~crs uru so111c11ow ignorii~~t of tlrc fuct 111ut Ilu~nuns evolved in sucial grOll(lS, untl l~uvu cxtensivc psycl~ologicul uclaptutions to stwiul life.
'Illis cut~~li~sion of lcvcls cltms conmu1 scvorul virtt~cs 111 tlrc target arlick: 'l'hu ut~tl~ors ore rlgl~t ll~ut a clirect 111ult11i11g of evolutio~rury t11c~try us u ~notivalional tl~~vtry is inialccl~~ittc, und thut not evdryone iceutgni.ms this; tlrcir c~~i c r i~~~c n t s icIcI to our k~~owlcdgu of thu vnriultlcs tl~ut our psyclntloliicul tt1cu.11unisrns
-. responcl to in run)pcration; in-group Iliusing is r p l~c n o~~~c~~o n that must IN) a~IcIrc~~cc1 and axl~laincd (we favor a coulitionul explanatio~~ in wldch small scale iu)alition;l aggression wits likely to have played a prominent role; Alexundcr 1971; l'cntl~y & Cosmiclcs IW). Nonctl~clcss, we find the claim tlrat "it was acluptivc for ancestral 1111mans to identify uuto~nuticrlly wit11 an in-group und to acccpt its goals us ll~cir own'' u~~cl tlrat "lrr~~nan nature is Itusicnlly stwial ratl~er tl~un sclfisl~" as no morc plil~~sil~le a psycl~ological charactcrizution than tlrc iclca tlrat bun~ans cognitively represent fitncss and selfislrly pttrsrlc it as a goal. IIuman nntura is not "1)asically social" or "I~usicnlly sctlfislI"; human nuturu is "l~asically" acollcction of ~nccl~u~ris~l~s designed to achieve gcnctic ~~ropagation In our environrncnt of evolutionary adaptcclncss in ways tlrat arc somctimcs c11~ractcri;zuldc us "selfish," sornctimcs us "ultruistic."
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